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Abstract—Machine Learning (ML) is making a strong resur-
gence in tune with the massive generation of unstructured data
which in turn requires massive computational resources. Due to
the inherently compute- and power-intensive structure of Neural
Networks (NNs), hardware accelerators emerge as a promising
solution. However, with technology node scaling below 10nm,
hardware accelerators become more susceptible to faults, which
in turn can impact the NN accuracy. In this paper, we study the
resilience aspects of Register-Transfer Level (RTL) model of NN
accelerators, in particular fault characterization and mitigation.
By following a High Level Synthesis (HLS) approach, first, we
characterize the vulnerability of various components of RTL
NN. We observed that the severity of faults depends on both
i) application-level specifications, i.e., NN data (inputs, weights,
or intermediate), NN layers, and NN activation functions, and ii)
architectural-level specifications, i.e., data representation model
and the parallelism degree of the underlying accelerator. Second,
motivated by characterization results, we present a low-overhead
fault mitigation technique that can efficiently correct bit flips, by
47.3% better than state-of-the-art methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning models and in particular Neural Networks
(NNs) are increasingly being used in the context of nonlinear
”cognitive” problems, such as natural language processing and
computer vision. These models can learn from a dataset in
the training phase and make predictions on a new, previously
unseen data in the inference/prediction/classification phase
with an ever-increasing accuracy. However, the compute- and
power-intensive nature of NNs prevents their effective deploy-
ment in resource-constrained environments, such as mobile
scenarios [1]. Hardware acceleration on Application Specific
Integrated Circuits (ASICs) or Field Programmable Gate Ar-
rays (FPGAs) offers a roadmap for enabling NNs in these
scenarios [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. However, similar to general
purpose devices, hardware accelerators are also susceptible to
faults (permanent/hard and transient/soft), as a consequence of
Single Event Upset (SEU), manufacturing defects, and below
safe-voltage operations. The ever-increasing rate of these faults
especially in nano-scale technology nodes can directly impact
the accuracy of NNs.
Traditionally, to perform early studies and apply fur-
ther optimizations, application-specific hardware designs are
modeled in different abstraction levels before the final in-
silicon implementation. For instance, a hardware design can
be modeled, e.g,. in software-level behavioral simulator,
functional level, Transaction-Level Model (TLM), Register-
Transfer Level (RTL), and transistor-level. Among them,
thanks to the evolution of High-Level Synthesis (HLS) tools
to abstract low-level complexities of the hardware [7], the
RTL model has received significant attention. This approach
can lead to a decreased development time with an early
evaluation of the final design, while conforming to final power,
energy, performance, and resilience goals in comparison to
the in-silicon ASIC/FPGA implementation. For instance, an
HLS-based approach has been used in recent research to
study the resilience of accelerators [8], [9], [10], [11]. In
this paper, we also use an HLS-based approach to study
accelerator resilience. However we use the HLS approach to
study the fault characterization and mitigation of RTL model
of NNs. Understanding this resilience behavior can provide
an opportunity for the further resilience studies on the in-
silicon NN accelerators. Main contributions of this work are
summarized as follows:
• Fault Characterization: We perform an in-depth vulnera-
bility study in the various components of the RTL NN
accelerators against permanent and transient faults. Our
experiments indicate that both application-level specifi-
cations, i.e., NN data (inputs, weights, or intermediate),
NN layers, and NN activation functions, as well as
architectural-level specifications, i.e., data representation
model and parallelism degree of the underlying acceler-
ator, have significant impact on the severity of faults.
• Fault Mitigation: Motivated by the fault characterization
experimental results, we present a low-overhead tech-
nique to mitigate faults by recovering corrupted bits,
without any need for redundant data. The efficiency of
the proposed technique is by 47.3% better than the state-
of-the-art methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
the overall methodology, i.e., the RTL NN and fault model, is
introduced. The fault characterization and mitigation studies
are discussed in Section III and Section IV, respectively. We
review the previous work in Section V and finally, the paper
is summarized and concluded in Section VI.
II. INTRODUCING THE OVERALL METHODOLOGY
This section presents our methodology to conduct the re-
silience study, i.e., the architecture of RTL NN accelerator
and fault model.
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Fig. 1: The Overall Methodology to Resilience Study of the RTL NN Accelerator.
A. The Architecture of RTL NN Accelerator
Specifications of the experimented RTL NN with a baseline
configuration is summarized in Table I. Our study features
a typical fully-connected NN that is also widely used in
the structure of other NN models [4]. Our study targets the
inference phase of NN since training is normally a one-time
process; additionally, the inference is repeatedly performed
to classify unknown data. As can be seen in Fig. 1(a), this
NN model is composed of input, hidden, and output layers,
where all adjacent layers are fully connected to each other. The
first/last layer is the input/output layer and has one neuron
for each component in the input/output vector. Between the
input and output layers, there are single/multiple hidden layers.
The interconnection between neurons of adjacent layers is
determined based on a collection of weights and biases, whose
values are tuned in the training phase. Each NN neuron uses
an activation function to determine its output. Finally, in the
output layer, a softmax function generates the final output
of the NN. We perform our experiments on a 6-layer NN,
i.e., ({Li, i ∈ [0, 5]}), one input, four hidden, and one output
layer(s). The four hidden layer sizes are fixed at 1024, 512,
256, 128 while input and output layer sizes are benchmark-
dependent (784, 54 and 2437 for input while 10, 8 and 52
for output layers for the three NN applications studied in
this paper, i.e., MNIST [12], Forest [13], and Reuters [14],
respectively.). Thus, there are five matrix multipliers among
adjacent layers, i.e., ({Layerj , j ∈ [0, 4]}), where Layerj
refers to the matrix multiplication of Lj and Lj+1. Among
benchmarks, MNIST is a set of black and white digitized
handwritten digits, each image composed of 784*8-bit pixels,
the output infers the number from 0 to 9 (10 output classes),
with 60000 training- and 10000 inference images. Forest
includes cartographic observations for classifying the forest
cover type. Reuters covers news articles for text categorization.
MNIST is most widely-used by the ML community to evaluate
the efficiency of novel NN methods. Hence, we use MNIST
as the main benchmark to evaluate our resilience studies. To
demonstrate the generality of experimental observations, we
briefly present results for Forest and Reuters, as well.
We build the RTL NN leveraging Bluespec [15], which
is a state-of-the-art rule-based cycle-accurate HLS ecosystem
TABLE I: Detailed Specifications of the Baseline RTL NN
Setup.
Neural Network (NN)
Type Fully-Connected Classifier
Topology (number of layers) 6L (1L input, 4L hidden, 1L output)
Per Layer Size (number of neurons) (784, 1024, 512, 256, 128, 10)= 2714
Total Number of Weights ∼1.5 million
Activation Function Logarithmic Sigmoid (logsig)
Benchmark
Name-Type MNIST [12]- Handwritten Digits
Number of Images Training: 60000, Inference: 10000
Number of Pixels per Image 28*28= 784
Number of Output Classes 10
Data Representation Model
Type 16-bits Fixed-Point (FP)
Precision Min sign and digit per layer (Fig. 2)
An Example Synthesize of RTL NN on FPGA
FPGA Platform-Chip VC707-Virtex7
Operating Frequency 100Mhz
BRAM Usage (Total: 2060) 70.8%
DSP Usage (Total: 2800) 8.6%
FF Usage (Total: 303,600) 3.8%
LUT Usage (Total: 607,200) 4.9%
Number of PEs 64
including the BSV language together with the BSC compiler
which can produce Verilog. As can be seen in Fig. 1(b),
our RTL design is composed of i) on-chip memories to
accommodate weights, ii) different set of registers to latch data
during the inference, iii) a set of multiplier-adder processing
elements (PEs) and an adder-tree to perform the required
matrix multiplications, and iv) a piece-wise linear model of the
activation function. This is a typical model of NN accelerators,
as surveyed in [16] for ASICs and in [17] for FPGAs. Through
this setup, input data is streamed through PEs in parallel to
perform the matrix multiplications in a fully-pipelined fashion.
The number of clock cycles to classify an input object item
can be computed as a function of |Li| and the number of PEs,
as shown in Eq. 1.1
T =
∑Nl−2
i=0 |Li| ∗ |Li+1|
#PEs
(1)
1For instance, by exploiting 64 PEs in our baseline RTL NN, T can
be computed as; T = 784∗1024+1024∗512+512∗256+256∗128+128∗10
64
=
1490944.
Fig. 2: Minimum Precision to Represent Data of RTL NN,
i.e., Inputs (IRs), Weighs (WRs), and Intermediate (IMRs).
(IRs are composed of only fraction components since input
data are in [0,1) range.)
It is important to note that our design is fully paramterisable
on the number and size of NN layer and the number of PEs;
also, it is fully synthesizable. For instance, the area utilization
of synthesizing it on VC707, a Xilinx Virtex7 technology is
shown in Table I. Furthermore, among pipeline stages of the
RTL design, various registers are exploited to latch different
types of NN data. At each cycle, a different data item is latched
to these registers. As can be seen in Fig. 1(b), there are three
types of registers, i.e., input registers (IRs), weight registers
(WRs), and intermediate registers (IMRs), which are leveraged
to latch input, weights, and intermediate data, respectively.
For experiments, we first export weights and biases of
the trained NN that is performed off-line using a MATLAB
implementation, initialize on-chip memories of the RTL de-
sign, and then start streaming 10000 input images to perform
the inference. Also, for representing data, we use the fixed-
point low-precision model. Note that lowering the precision
of data is a common technique for applications in the approx-
imate computing domain, in particular for NNs performing
inference [18], to achieve power and performance efficiency
with negligible accuracy loss. Following this approach, we
use per-layer minimum precision fixed-point model. The bit-
width of data (input, weights, and intermediate) is fixed to
16-bits, composed of the sign, digit, and fraction components.
Toward this goal, with a pre-processing analysis, we extract the
minimum bit-widths of the sign and digit components per layer
and the rest of 16 bits are filled by the fraction component. As
we experimentally observed, this quantification does not lead
to any considerable accuracy loss in comparison to a full-
precision data model. The minimum precision is used in this
paper is summarized in Fig. 2. Also, by following the default
internal approach of Bluespec FixedPoint (FP) library, negative
numbers (< 0) are represented in two’s complement model.
B. Fault Model
As can be seen in Fig. 1, the fault injection unit is developed
on top of the RTL NN classifier to manage fault injection
(a) Permanent Faults. (b) Transient Faults.
Fig. 3: Repeating Trials to Achieve Statistically Significant
Results. (Shows results of single-bit fault trials)
into registers, i.e., IRs, WRs, and IMRs. It is important
to note that other components of the RTL NN, e.g,. on-chip
memory and computing PEs are also susceptible to faults.
However, many resilience solutions have been developed for
these components, such as Error Correction Code (ECC) for
memories [19] and time-staggered Razor shadow latches for
PEs [20]; thus, we perform this study by fault injecting in
registers, the main state-holding elements in the RTL design.
1) When, Where, and How frequently are Faults Injected?:
Our fault injection unit supports permanent (stuck-at-0 and
stuck-at-1) and transient faults. Permanent faults can cause bits
to permanently get stuck at 0 or 1, such as faults stemming
from extremely low-voltage operation [21]. Thus, they result
in bit flips, if and only if logical values of faulty bits are
different than the values at which the physical bits are stuck. In
contrast, transient faults such as radiation induced faults [22],
flip contents of bits for a few cycles (typically one cycle).
Also, note that we evaluate the effect of both single-(single
fault within a register) and multiple-bit (several faults within
a register) faults to cover different fault rates. In short, we
consider the following:
• When? Permanent faults are stuck at 0 or 1 for the whole
inference cycles (T as defined in Eq. 1), from first to the
last. In contrast, transient faults occur in a single random
cycle within inference T cycles.
• Where? We inject faults into randomly-selected set of
bits of a register of the RTL NN.
• How frequently? To comprehensively study the impact of
faults in the inference error, we repeat the fault injection
for each input data item (for instance each image in
MNIST). In other words, we generate a fault and while
input data is streaming into the classifier one-by-one, we
inject the generated fault for each of the input data items,
individually. This accelerated fault injection campaign
allows us to quickly evaluate the impact of faults on all
input data items.
To generate faults, we use the pseudorandom number
generator library of Bluespec, i.e., Randomize, to select a
random register, random set of bits, and random cycle (in
the transient case). Later on, we inject the generated fault in
the corresponding locations/cycles, while streaming the input
data into the classifier, allow the completion of the inference
for all input data, and finally, compute the inference error by
comparing classified against the golden output data provided
by the benchmark suite.
(a) NN Data: stuck-at-0 (b) NN Data: stuck-at-1 (c) NN Data: transient
(d) NN Layers: stuck-at-0 (e) NN Layers: stuck-at-1 (f) NN Layers: transient
(g) NN Functions: stuck-at-0 (h) NN Functions: stuck-at-1 (i) NN Functions: transient
(j) FP Components: stuck-at-0 (k) FP Components: stuck-at-1 (l) FP Components: transient
(m) Number of PEs: stuck-at-0 (n) Number of PEs: stuck-at-1 (o) Number of PEs: transient
(p) Datasets: stuck-at-0 (q) Datasets: stuck-at-1 (r) Datasets: transient
Fig. 4: Fault Characterization in RTL NN Accelerator. (Different Scales in the y-axis.)
(a) Statistical Sparsity Analysis
of Inputs (IRs), Weights (WRs),
and Intermediate (IMRs) Data.
(b) The Statistical Analysis in
Ranges of Input Registers (IRs)
Values.
Fig. 5: Histograms to show the sparsity of data of MNIST,
used to justify; (a) why stuck-at-1 faults cause higher inference
errors than stuck-at-0 faults, and (b) why IMRs are more
vulnerable than WRs.
2) Statistical Fault Injection Methodology: To achieve sta-
tistically significant results, we repeat experiments multiple
times. In each trial, a different fault (a random register, set
of bits, and cycle in the transient case) is randomly generated
and injected. Finally, after repeating the injection for multiple
times, the final inference error is calculated as the median of all
these trials. If trials are repeated for significantly enough times,
this statistical fault injection approach [23] can lead to accurate
results in comparison to the deterministic approach where all
possible locations/cycles permutations are considered for the
faults injection. Note that the deterministic approach is in
practice hard to follow since there is billions of possibilities
of faults generation. To find the enough number of trials note
that it can be tuned according to the expected confidence level-
the probability that the exact value is within a predefined error
margin. Experimental results for an example single-bit fault
injection case are shown in Fig. 3, in terms of the aggregated
median error rate of RTL NN in the y-axis and the number
of trials in the x-axis (up to 1000). As can be seen, with
error margin 1%, 1000 trails leads to an acceptable confidence-
level (∼90%) with a negligible standard deviation. Hence, we
perform all our experiments 1000 times and use the median
of these trials to report in this paper.
III. FAULT CHARACTERIZATION
In this section, we evaluate the sensitivity of various com-
ponents of our RTL NN against faults; i.e., application-level
components (NN data, NN layers, and NN activation func-
tions) and architectural-level components (data representation
model and number of PEs). Toward this goal, we inject faults
in these components, individually, by varying corresponding
parameters of the baseline configuration as detailed in Table
I. Experimental results of the fault characterization are shown
in Fig. 4. In this figure, the x-axis represents the number
of injected faults per input object (image in MNIST), which
varies from 0 for the fault-free NN case, to 16 for the case
where all bits of the NN register are faulty.
A. Overall Effect of Different Fault Types in RTL NN
We conduct the RTL NN fault characterization study in
terms of the following fault categories:
• Permanent vs. Transient: As expected, permanent faults
cause higher NN errors than transient faults. This is
due to the persistence of permanent faults for the whole
computation cycles (T as explained in Eq. 1), while
transient faults manifest themselves for a single cycle
within T cycles.
• Stuck-at-1 vs. Stuck-at-0: The permanent faults can be
further categorized as being Stuck-at-1 or Stuck-at-0. As
can be seen in Fig. 4, stuck-at-1 faults cause higher NN
errors than stuck-at-0 faults. This observations is due to
the sparsity of NN data, i.e., more ’0’ than ’1’ bits in the
NN RTL registers, by on average 6.5X as can be seen in
Fig. 5a.
B. Application-Level Fault Analysis
1) NN Data: The sensitivity of various NN data, i.e., inputs,
weights, and intermediate data is evaluated by injecting faults
in corresponding registers individually, i.e., IRs, WRs, and
IMRs. Experimental results are shown in Fig. 4a, 4b, and 4c,
for stuck-at-0, stuck-at-1, and transient cases, respectively. We
observe that:
• IRs: Faults injection in IRs causes the relatively lowest
inference error, since they are composed of only fraction
component.
• WRs and IMRs: In RTL NN, IMRs are the most
vulnerable registers, due to two reasons; first, as can
be seen in Fig. 2, IMRs have relatively the longest
digit component, which are significantly sensitive against
faults. Second, IMRs are used in the adder tree to
maintain results of multipliers, as can be seen in Fig. 1.
Therefore, any faults in IMRs is propagated to the next
level of the adder tree without any coefficient. In contrast,
WRs are inputs of multipliers and any fault in WRs
is multiplied by IRs and then propagated. Nevertheless
however, IRs accommodate very small values; as can be
seen in Fig. 5a, 84.5% of them are in the [0, 0.1] range,
which limits the fault propagation in WRs.
2) NN Layers: The sensitivity of NN layers, i.e.,
{Layerj , j ∈ [0, 4]} is evaluated by injecting faults in registers
of these layers, individually. Experimental results are shown
in Fig. 4d, 4e, and 4f, for stuck-at-0, stuck-at-1, and transient
cases, respectively. We observe that:
• Permanent Faults: Permanent faults in inner layers of the
RTL NN, i.e., closer to the output layer, cause relatively
lower inference error. Due to the persistence of permanent
faults for the whole per-layer cycles, this observation is
the consequence of relatively less cycles in inner layers,
proportional to layer sizes, as detailed in Table I.
• Transient Faults: In contrast, transient faults in inner
layers have relatively more impact on the inference error,
since, first, sizes of NN layers do not play any role for
transient faults with momentary behavior, and second,
faults in inner layers have relatively less probability to be
masked through the thresholding in activation functions
of earlier layers.
3) NN Activation Functions: The activation function plays
a crucial role in the overall accuracy and efficiency of NN.
Hence, in this section, we study the fault propagation with two
state-of-the-art NN activation functions, i.e., positive saturating
linear (satlin) [24] and logarithmic sigmoid (logsig) [25]
functions. Experimental results are shown in Fig. 4g, Fig.
4h, and Fig. 4i, for stuck-at-0, stuck-at-1, and transient cases,
respectively. As can be seen, a relatively less error is observed
by leveraging logsig against satlin. As already discussed, NN
data are mainly near-zero. For this type of data, logsig applies
a more aggressive quantification and thresholding than satlin,
which in turn, limits the faults propagation.
C. Architectural-Level Fault Analysis
1) Different Components of Data Representation Model:
The sensitivity of various components of fixed-point data
representation mode, i.e., sign, digit, and fraction is evaluated
by injecting faults in corresponding components individually.
Experimental results are shown in Fig. 4j, 4k, and 4l, for
stuck-at-0, stuck-at-1, and transient cases, respectively. Note
that for each component, the maximum number of injected
faults is equal to the maximum bit-width of the corresponding
components, as detailed in Fig. 2. We observe that sign,
digit, and fraction components are in order, relatively more
vulnerable, proportional to their positional significance, as
expected.
2) Parallelism Degree (Number of PEs): The number of
PEs can impact the fault propagation behavior, since with
respect to Eq. 1, it inversely affects the number of inference
cycles (T ). T determines the data reuse degree, i.e., the number
of register reloads to accomplish the inference, which can
be directly translated to the persistence of permanent faults.
To empirically perform this experiment, we repeat the fault
injection for different number of PEs, i.e., 64, 256, and 1024.
Fig. 4m, 4n, and 4o show experimental results in the presence
of stuck-at-0, stuck-at-1, and transient faults, respectively. We
observe that:
• Permanent Faults: In the presence of permanent faults,
a relatively more PEs corresponds to proportionally
reduced inference error. As said, it is the result of a
relatively fewer number of clock cycles (T ) and in turn,
less persistence of permanent faults.
• Transient Faults: In contrast, in the presence of transient
faults, the number of PEs does not play any role, due to
the momentary behavior of transient faults.
D. Fault Characterization of Other NN Benchamrks
We repeat the fault characterization study in Forest and
Reuters benchmarks, as well, by following the similar exper-
imental methodology explained in Section II. We observed
that a vast majority of observations on MNIST, as discussed
in Sections III-A and III-B, is staying valid for Forest and
Reuters, as well. Experimental results of the fault propagation
in those datasets are shown in Fig. 4p, 4q, and 4r for
stuck-at-0, stuck-at-1, and transient cases, respectively. Due
List 1: Pseudo-code of Proposed Fault Mitigation Technique.
1: if (reg[N-1] & reg[N-2] are flipped) reg <= 0;
// WORD MASKING
2: else begin
3: if (reg[N-1] is flipped) reg[N-1] <= reg[N-2];
// SIGN-BIT MASKING WITH MSB
4: for(i in [N-2, 0]) if (reg[i] is flipped) reg[i] <= reg[N-1];
// BIT MASKING
5: end
to our experimental observations, most important points are
highlighted as follows:
• In our NN, the inherent fault-free inference error rate of
MNIST, Forest, and Reuters are 2.56%, 38.7%, and 8.9%,
respectively, very close to the state-of-the-art implemen-
tation [4].
• The rate of NN inference error increase of Reuter dataset
in presence of additional permanent faults, is relatively
more significant, since the size of the input layer of
Reuter is considerable larger (2837 vs. 52/784), which
in turn, leads to more persistence of permanent faults
during the clock cycles (T ).
IV. FAULT MITIGATION
In this section, we introduce and evaluate an efficient and
low-overhead fault mitigation technique in RTL NN, relying
on the fault characterization results. The aim is to recover from
faults without leveraging any redundant bits as is common for
traditional fault correction mechanisms such as Triple Modular
Redundancy (TMR) [26]. The proposed technique relies on the
sparsity of NN data and accordingly, targets to mask faulty
bits. This technique combines three individual mechanisms,
i.e., first, Word Masking to set all bits of the corrupted register
to ’0’, second, Bit Masking to mask faulty bit with the sign-
bit within the faulty register, and third, Sign-bit Masking
to mask the sign-bit with the Most Significant Bit (MSB).
Among them, Word- and Bit Masking techniques are proposed
first time in Minerva [4]; however, they are used individually
and with a poor efficiency to protect the sign-bit, which in
fact is relatively the most vulnerable component. To alleviate
this issue, we propose to mask the sign-bit with the MSB,
since through a statistical analysis we observed that with the
probability of 99,9% the sign-bit and MSB have the same
logic value. This observation is the consequence of near-zero
NN data and also two’s complement data representation model,
which finally leads to sign bit =MSB=’0’ for positive (> 0)
and sign bit =MSB =’1’ for negative near-zero data (< 0).
It is important to note that about the fault detection we
follow same assumptions with Minerva, i.e., there is no
limit on the number of faults that can be detected and also,
information is available on which bits are affected. To achieve
them, in Minerva, Razor shadow latches [38] are simulated that
can detect faults by monitoring circuit delays. ASIC [4] and
FPGA [37] implementation of Razor report 0.3% and 2.6%
of area overheads, respectively; which shows the feasibility of
(a) Evaluating Different Fault
Mitigation Techniques (on
MNIST).
(b) Enhanced Hybrid Technique
on Different Datasets.
Fig. 6: Evaluating Fault Mitigation Techniques (shown for
stuck-at-0 case as similar efficiency observed for other types).
exploiting this method in the synthesize version of our RTL
NN, as well.
The pseudo-code of the proposed fault mitigation technique
is shown in List. 1. In this pseudo-code, the bit-width of the
register (reg) is assumed to be N, [N-1, 0], where reg[N-1] and
reg[N-2] are referring to the sign-bit and MSB, respectively.
As can be seen, the proposed technique is composed of three
sub-methods:
• Sign-Bit Masking with MSB: We use MSB as the mask
of the sign-bit, since through an experimental analysis we
observed these bits have same logic, with the probability
of 99.9%.
• Bit Masking: Then, we apply Bit Masking technique to
recover non sign-bit flips, by using sign-bit as the mask.
• Word Masking: And finally, if MSB is itself also flipped,
we reset the register to ’0’.
We evaluate the proposed technique in our RTL NN and
compare it with the individual Word- and Bit Masking tech-
niques. Experimental results of the evaluation of these fault
mitigation techniques are shown in Fig. 6a. As can be seen:
• Minerva Bit Masking: The efficiency of this technique is
relatively the worst, since not only it does not have any
mechanism to protect the sign-bit but also masks other
faulty bits with sign-bit, which can be faulty.
• Minerva Word Masking: This technique leads to a con-
stant inference error, independent of the number of de-
tected faults, since the faulty register is reset to ’0’, when
at least one fault is detected.
• Proposed Enhanced Hybrid Technique: This technique
shows relatively the best performance to correct faulty
bits and achieve the lowest inference error, since it takes
the advantage of both Bit- and Word Masking techniques
and also, complement it by using MSB to mask the sign-
bit faults.
In short, our Enhanced Hybrid Technique mitigates faults
and achieve by 47.3% and 44.1% lower NN inference error
than Minerva Bit- and Word Masking techniques, respectively.
A. Fault Mitigation of Other NN Benchmarks
We apply the proposed enhance hybrid fault mitigation tech-
nique on Forest and Reuters datasets, as well. The efficiency
of the proposed fault mitigation method is shown in Fig. 6b.
By comparing these results against the default experiments
without any protection in Fig. 4p, it can be observed that
the proposed method has the capability to cover faults in all
tested datasets, since the sparsity of data is an inherent feature
of these benchmarks and it is also the base of the proposed
technique.
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review recent works on the resilience of
NNs and highlight our contributions.
A. Different Methodologies to Study NN Resilience
It has been shown that NNs are inherently resilient [27],
[28], [29]; however, the ever-increasing fault rate in nano-
scale technology nodes necessitates further studies in this area
to explorer better trade-off of reliability, power, energy, and
performance. Hence, in recent years NN resilience is studied
with different approaches, e.g., software-level simulations or
theoretical analyzes [30], [31], SPICE simulations [4], [32],
[33], and experimenting on the real hardware operating on
low-voltage regimes [34], [35], [36]. Among them, it is evident
that software-level simulations and theoretical analyzes lack
the information of the underlying hardware platform and are
relatively less precise. In contrast, SPICE-based studies are
more precise; however, these studies require significant circuit-
level efforts. Our aim is to have the best of both worlds: to have
the flexibility and simplicity of software-level fault-injection
with the precision of circuit-level implementations. Thanks
to the evolution of HLS tools, the precise modeling of the
underlying hardware has been facilitated, which provides an
opportunity to perform such studies comprehensively with an
accuracy close to the real hardware. This approach is also
followed by some recent works to study the resilience of
several other applications [8], [9], [10], [11].
B. Fault Characterization on NNs
The impact of faults in different models of NNs have been
studied in a wide body of recent work as surveyed in [27].
Among the most relevant existing works, Minerva [4] per-
forms a characterization on the sparsity of data and analyzes
the efficiency of leveraging fixed-point data representation
model. In the same line, [29] studied the vulnerability of
various layers of NN. Also, recently [32] studied the fault
propagation in an ASIC model of NN focused on the vul-
nerability of different NN layers. However, these works does
not present comprehensive characterization studies, whereas
our paper comprehensively studies the sensitivity analysis
of both application- (NN data, NN layers, and activation
function) and architectural-level (parallelism degree and data
representation model) components. This comprehensiveness is
the consequence of using HLS tools to facilitate the RTL
modeling of the NNs.
C. Fault Mitigation on NNs
To mitigate faults several general techniques are proposed
in different domains such as TMR [26], Razor [38], [20], ECC
using Hamming code [19], Hardware Transnational Memory
(HTM) [39], among others. These techniques can be poten-
tially customized to mitigate faults of NNs, as well; however,
with timing, area, or power costs. Also, techniques adapted
for NNs are surveyed in [40], such as explicit redundancy,
retraining, and modifying learning/inference phases. In this
paper, instead of costly fault tolerance operations we present
an application-aware fault mitigation in NNs, which does
not require to exploit any redundant data bits or additional
considerable overheads. In the same line, Minerva [4] has
also proposed two fault mitigation techniques, i.e., bit masking
and word masking, which rely on the sparsity of NN data. In
our paper, we use these techniques as baseline comparison
cases. We explored their efficiency issues when the sign-
bit is corrupted and accordingly, presented a more efficient
technique to be effective in such cases, as well.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We empirically investigated an RTL hardware-aware design
of NN accelerator from the resilience perspective, i.e., fault
characterization and mitigation. We comprehensively charac-
terized the vulnerability of various components of the design,
in the presence of permanent and transient faults. Our experi-
ments indicate that the following parameters play crucial roles
in the fault severity: data representation mode, NN data (in-
puts, weights, or intermediate), NN layers, activation function,
and parallelism degree of the underlying accelerator. Relying
on the characterization results, we proposed a low-overhead
fault mitigation technique to efficiently correct corrupted bits
of RTL NN. Our proposed technique can mitigate faults, by
47.3% better than state-of-the-art methods.
We plan to perform fault characterization and mitigation
study on more advanced RTL NN models, e.g., Convolutional
NNs (CNNs) and Recursive NNs (RNNs), as well.
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